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A Contractual Dilemma: Where Arbitration 
Agreements and Delegation Provisions 
Collide 
Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
Trent H. Hamoud* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Interpretation of arbitration agreements continues to present unique and 
challenging issues in Missouri law.  Arbitration is a mainstay of the wider 
field of alternative dispute resolution, seeking to merge the competing 
interests of would-be litigants in a speedier, less expensive, less formalized 
environment.  Delegation provisions, however, serve as an additional 
analytical hurdle in determining when and what disputes can be rightfully sent 
to arbitration.  At first glance, a seemingly irreconcilable dilemma is 
presented.  Must assent to the arbitration agreement, and thus the delegation 
provision, exist before the dispute will be sent to arbitration?  Or is the simple 
appearance of a delegation provision, combined with an absence of an explicit 
challenge to that same provision, per se sufficient to send the arbitrability 
dispute to the arbitrator?  
The American Bar Association defines arbitration as “a private process 
where disputing parties agree that one or several individuals can make a 
decision about the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments.”1  
Delegation provisions are separate agreements between parties allowing for 
threshold issues of the arbitration agreement, such as whether a particular 
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1. Arbitration, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutio
nProcesses/arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/MM8E-RZNU] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
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controversy is included within the agreement, to be decided through 
arbitration.2  So widespread is the use of arbitration agreements in American 
society that it is estimated more than sixty million American workers are 
bound by individual agreements.3  Notably, approximately eighty percent of 
the largest companies designate workplace-related disputes for arbitration.4 
Part II of this Note summarizes the facts and procedural background of 
Theroff’s employment dispute.  Part III outlines the legal background relevant 
to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling, explaining the common law 
evolution of arbitration and providing a brief primer on pertinent contract law 
principles.  Part IV details the Theroff court’s divided ruling, which ultimately 
held that there was neither an agreement to compel arbitration nor assent to 
the delegation provision.5  Part V distinguishes related U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, while briefly opining on possible implications of the principal opinion’s 
reasoning and the enforcement or lack thereof of arbitration agreements and 
delegation provisions, more generally. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. arose from an employment dispute.6  
Plaintiff Nina Theroff alleged she was constructively discharged by 
Defendants Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (“Dollar Tree”) and store manager Janie 
Harper when her request for a reasonable workplace accommodation was 
refused.7  Specifically, Theroff wished to allow her service dog to accompany 
her.8 
After Plaintiff Nina Theroff applied for a job at Dollar Tree, she was 
invited to the store for an interview with Assistant Manager Kayla Swift.9  It 
was during this interview that Theroff informed Swift she was legally blind 
and required the use of various assistive devices.10  Swift then told Theroff 
that she was hired and directed her to return to the store a few days later to 
complete electronic hiring paperwork.11 
One of the documents digitally signed by Theroff, and at issue in the 
present case, was a mutual agreement to arbitrate claims.12  Under the mutual 
 
2. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010). 
3. Imre S. Szalai, The Failure of Legal Ethics to Address the Abuses of Forced 
Arbitration, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 127, 129 (2018). 
4. Id. 
5. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Mo. 2020) (en 
banc). 
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agreement, it was specified that JAMS employment arbitration rules and 
procedures controlled.13  JAMS Rule 11(b) grants the arbitrator the authority 
to determine jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes.14 
Theroff alleged she only brought a small magnifier with her to the 
interview, as she was not told in advance that the hiring paperwork was to be 
completed electronically.15  Noticing that use of the magnifier on the 
computer screen would take some time, Swift offered to help Theroff 
complete the hiring paperwork by taking control of the keyboard and directing 
Theroff for certain information, such as her address, phone number, and 
account information, unless Swift thought it would be faster for Theroff to 
enter the information herself.16  With the entire process lasting approximately 
thirty minutes, Theroff maintains that Swift never discussed arbitration, 
waiver of a jury trial, or JAMS Rules.17 
Swift’s version of events substantially differs from Theroff’s account.  
Swift denies that she assisted Theroff in navigating the electronic hiring 
paperwork.18  Swift also disputed that Theroff was legally blind or even that 
Theroff informed her of her need to use assistive devices because of her visual 
impairments.19  Swift stated that she did not electronically sign the mutual 
agreement for Theroff, nor field any of Theroff’s questions relating to the 
mutual agreement.20  Questioning revealed inconsistencies regarding Swift’s 
awareness of facts regarding Theroff’s hiring.21  
 
13. Id.  JAMS, formerly “Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,” is 
recognized as a top provider of alternative dispute resolution services in the U.S. and 
abroad. Richard Chernick & Robert B. Davidson, JAMS: A Longstanding Provider of 
Dispute Resolution Services to the International Business Community, 15 AM. REV. 
INT'L ARB. 593, 593 (2004).  JAMS Rules are modeled after guiding principles of cost 
and time efficiency, prompt communication, and streamlined proceedings. Arno L. 
Eisen & Felix Lautenschlager, I Like Jams on My Toast: The Jams International 
Arbitration Rules in A Nutshell, 11 VINDOBONA J. 187, 188–89 (2007). As one might 
surmise, JAMS Rules are procedural in nature, and “provide that the contract shall be 
governed by the ‘rules of law’ agreed upon by the parties.” Id. at 202.  If no such 
choice of law provision is explicitly provided for by the parties, JAMS Rules “instruct 
the Tribunal to apply the law or rules of law which it deems most appropriate.” Id. 







21. Id. (noting that the circuit court did not make any findings). 
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After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court overruled the motion to 
compel arbitration.22  Both the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western 
District and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court.23  The 
highest court held that there existed neither a valid agreement to compel 
arbitration, nor assent to the delegation provision.24 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Before close attention is given to the Theroff opinion, a brief background 
discussion is first necessary.  This Part begins by introducing the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1925 and the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act, as well as 
how these Acts mesh with contracts of adhesion and the unconscionability 
defense.  Next, key U.S. Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Missouri 
decisions in the arbitration space are examined.  Finally, this Part concludes 
by teeing up the critical topics of delegation provisions and severability. 
A.  The FAA and UAA 
Courts today understand arbitration as a contract matter.25  Therefore, 
elementary contract principles such as mutual assent – offer plus acceptance 
– and consideration dictate the validity of an arbitration agreement.26  But 
what exactly constitutes an arbitration agreement?  As noted above, arbitration 
is defined as “a private process where disputing parties agree that one or 
several individuals can make a decision about the dispute after receiving 
evidence and hearing arguments.”27  From this definition, it becomes evident 
that assent is a critical component in upholding an arbitration agreement.28 
A review of courts’ historical treatment of arbitration agreements sheds 
light on the modern jurisprudence.  One might find interesting that one of the 
earlier high court cases regarding arbitration is a Pennsylvania probate case 
from 1791.29  The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries saw courts refusing 
to compel arbitration under the doctrines of ouster and revocability.30  Early 
 
22. Id. at 434–35. 
23. Id. at 435.; Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. WD 80812, 2018 WL 
1914851, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018). 
24. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440. 
25. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
26. See Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 437. 
27. Arbitration, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
28. See Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70, 15 S.W. 
317, 318 (Mo. 1891)) (“It is a well[-]settled principle of law that to constitute a 
contract[,] the minds of the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.”). 
29. Cornogg v. Abraham, 1791 WL 481, at *1 (Pa. 1791). 
30. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 371 
(2018).  Here, the doctrines of ouster and revocability are referring to the jurisdiction 
of courts to hear disputes otherwise displaced by an arbitration agreement.  The 
doctrine of ouster provided that “parties cannot ‘oust’ courts’ power to resolve legal 
4
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common law contradictions between contract theory and arbitration are 
perhaps best illustrated by courts recoiling at the prospect that more 
sophisticated parties could escape judicial oversight altogether if they instead 
contracted upfront for resolution of a future dispute by another party arising 
from that same contract.31  It was not until the adoption of the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) that arbitration agreements could be 
reconciled with more traditional “freedom to contract” principles.32 
The FAA can be placed into further context through this economic and 
historical lens.  Consider Lochner v. New York, the case that would ultimately 
lead to the early Twentieth Century period of American jurisprudence known 
as the Lochner Era.33  Lochner represented a strong deference by the Supreme 
Court to economic due process rights and freedom of contract.34  While 
Lochner has long since been overruled and today largely stands as no more 
than a relic of a laissez-faire economic past, “many of the arguments made to 
 
claims, and [the doctrine of] revocability condoned a party’s unilateral revocation of 
an arbitration agreement.” Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR 
Agreements by Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004). 
31. See Horton, supra note 30, at 377 n.97 (“See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister (1746) 
95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532; 1 Wils. K.B. 129, 129 (refusing to dismiss a case concerning 
an insurance policy that contained an arbitration provision because ‘the agreement of 
the parties cannot oust this [c]ourt’ of jurisdiction); Vynior's Case (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 
597, 599-600; 8 Co. Rep. 81b-82b (voiding an arbitration award made after one party 
tried to revoke the arbitration agreement).”). 
32. Id. at 377–78.  A close study of the legislative history of the FAA establishes 
that its “purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by 
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other 
contracts.” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).  Therefore, judicial 
enforcement, rather than expediency, was the “overriding goal” of the FAA. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). 
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73–74 (1905), overruled by West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 413–14 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage 
law for women as not violative of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth 
Amendment) (striking down state law setting bakers' hours as it conflicted with the 
liberty of contract protected by the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  The Lochner Era is defined as “[t]he time from 1890 to 1937, in which 
the United States Supreme Court, using a broad interpretation of due process that 
protected economic rights, tended to strike down economic regulations of working 
conditions, wages or hours in favor of laissez-faire economic policy.” Lochner Era, 
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lochner_era 
[https://perma.cc/3DZW-2RT6] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
34. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56. 
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support a broad application of the [FAA] recall Lochner's libertarian 
underpinnings.”35 
The FAA, however, does not stand in isolation in Missouri arbitration 
law.  Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) provides that any written 
contract or agreement submitting any controversy between parties is valid, 
enforceable, and irrevocable, absent some limited exceptions.36  In practice, 
one key difference between the FAA and the UAA is that the latter contains a 
conspicuousness requirement, while the former does not.37  While the UAA 
will exclusively control for an entirely Missouri-based employer, challenges 
may arise in those instances where the FAA supersedes the UAA.38  
Therefore, by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the FAA 
controls whenever the UAA would otherwise conflict with federal law.39 
B.  Adhesion Contracts and the Unconscionability Defense 
Certain contracts of adhesion can constitute a limited exception under 
the UAA.40  An adhesion contract is created by a party with disproportionately 
stronger bargaining power, offered by that party to its weaker counterpart on 
a “take this or nothing basis.”41  That a contract is one of adhesion, however, 
does not necessarily mean under contemporary doctrine that it is one of 
unconscionability.42  Resistance by American courts to arbitration agreements 
can be closely traced to the evolution of the unconscionability defense in 
 
35. Id.;.Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 805 n.13 (2009). 
36. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350–435.470 (1980). 
37. Specifically, under the UAA, an arbitration agreement must be accompanied 
by a notice stating: “THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRAITON 
PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.” MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 435.460 (1980). 
38. See, e.g., Duggan v. Zip Mail Services, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding agreement unenforceable under the UAA due to lack of key 
conspicuousness provision, but still enforceable under the FAA). 
39. Id. 
40. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (1996). 
41. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 438 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (en 
banc)).  (The terms of an adhesion contract “are imposed upon the weaker party who 
has no choice but to conform,” and such terms “unexpectedly or unconscionably limit 
the obligations and liability of the drafting party.”)  An adhesion contract is not per se 
invalid under Missouri law, however. Id. 
42. See Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us 
About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration 
Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 769 (2014) (concluding that “[a]lthough a court 
may ultimately determine that a contract of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable, 
most state courts have held that a contract of adhesion is not per se unconscionable.”). 
6
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contract law.43  Modernly, the two species of the unconscionability defense 
are procedural and substantive unconscionability.44  Procedural 
unconscionability involves the mechanics of contract formation, whereas 
substantive unconscionability involves the actual terms of the contract itself.45  
As applied to arbitration, cases asserting substantive unconscionability could 
contest the guiding rules, chosen arbitrator(s), and provision for or 
disallowance of appeal.46  Procedural unconscionability, however, involves 
the mechanics of the formation of the contract.47  Cases challenging an 
arbitration agreement on the basis of procedural unconscionability often 
allege that the agreement was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or 
otherwise buried in the fine print of the agreement.48 
C.  Key Cases 
A slew of important U.S. Supreme Court cases helped topple the initial 
resistance to arbitration clauses.  In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corporation, the Court stated that the FAA evinced a 
“liberal federal policy [by Congress] favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”49  
 
43. See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 391–
94 (2012). 
44. Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 508 n.2 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc) (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) 
(en banc)).  “[I]t is inaccurate to suggest [in Missouri] that an agreement or provision 
must be separately found to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to 
be invalid.” Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 432–33 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc) (citing Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492, n.3 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc)).  Instead, “[i]t is more accurate to state that a court will look at both the 
procedural and substantive aspects of a contract to determine whether, considered 
together, they make the agreement or provision in question unconscionable.” Id. at 
433. 
45. Robinson, 364 S.W.3d at 508 n.2 (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)) (noting that “[p]rocedural 
unconscionability focuses on such things as high pressure sales tactics, unreadable 
fine print, or misrepresentation among other unfair issues in the contract formation 
process,” whereas “[s]ubstantive unconscionability means an undue harshness in the 
contract terms”). 
46. See Horton, supra note 43, at 393. 
47. Robinson, 364 S.W.3d at 508 n.2 (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)). 
48. See Horton, supra note 43, at 393. 
49. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
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And in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held, by a five-to-four 
decision, that the FAA superseded a California rule invalidating consumer 
contract provisions that require individual arbitration and that waive any right 
to bring forth a class action.50  
The Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams result turned on the decision in 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson.51  The Allied-Bruce Court 
held that the interstate commerce language of the FAA should be assigned a 
broad interpretation.52  Concurring in the judgment of the majority, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor rested on stare decisis considerations.53  O’Connor’s 
departure from the majority, however, rested in her belief that the FAA should 
not be given such a broad interpretation.54  Still rejecting the view that 
Congress intended for the FAA to apply in state courts, as supported by her 
prior dissents,55 Justice O’Connor concluded that Congress, rather than the 
Court, should expand the scope of the FAA.56  The green light was now 
shining bright for the U.S. Supreme Court to extend the FAA to employment 
contracts. 
It is here that the tensions between state and federal arbitration law start 
to become further evident.  In Circuit City, again by a five-to-four decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA covers employment contracts of 
workers unless that class of workers has been specifically exempted from the 
FAA, as is the case with seamen and railroad workers.57  In a contested 
analysis, the majority applied the maxim ejusdem generis to reach the 
conclusion that the FAA specifically excluded only transportation workers.58  
The Circuit City Court further concluded that the use of the phrase “affecting 
 
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
51. Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
52. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 
(1995). 
53. Id. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
54. Id. at 282  (warning that “[t]he reading of § 2 adopted today will displace 
many state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers.”). 
55. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); see also York Int'l v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 465 U.S. 1016 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21–36 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
56. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
57. Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
58. Id. at 115.  Ejusdem generis means “[o]f the same kind, class, or nature.” 
Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (noting that “[i]n statutory 
construction, the ‘ejusdem generis rule’ is that where general words follow an 
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such 
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as 
applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned.”). 
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commerce” evidenced Congress’s intent to enforce arbitration agreements 
under federal law courtesy of the Commerce Clause.59  
Finally, a few recent Supreme Court of Missouri cases on arbitration are 
worth highlighting.  The Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Newberry 
v. Jackson recently unanimously agreed that “[c]ourts should not assume that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”60  Eat v. CMH Homes, Inc. states 
that a lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement does not necessarily result 
in a nullification of the arbitration agreement.61 
D.  Delegation Provisions and Severability 
The final key background topic necessary to understanding arbitration 
clauses involve delegation provisions and severability.  A delegation 
provision is an agreement to send to arbitration threshold issues relating to the 
arbitration agreement.62  In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson that a court may hear only those 
challenges specifically leveled at a delegation provision.63  However, a 
challenge to the agreement as a whole, absent such a specific challenge, could 
only be heard by the arbitrator.64  
Severability is a fairly straightforward concept.  The FAA renders 
delegation provisions severable from the rest of the contractual agreement.65  
Thus, a court could strike down a delegation provision without invalidating 
the rest of the wider contractual agreement.66  Such a judicial manuever has 
several important implications.  Again, in the employment context, a party 
would first need to directly challenge a delegation provision’s validity prior 
to a challenge to the remainder of the employment agreement, including the 
 
59. Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 115 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Companies, Inc., 513 U.S. at 277). 
60. State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474–75 (Mo. 2019) (en 
banc), abrogated by Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. 2020) 
(en banc) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). 
61. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
62. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).  Thus, by this 
definition, a delegation provision amounts to arbitration about arbitration! See Horton, 
supra note 30. 
63. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010).   
64. Id.   
65. Id. at 70 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 
445 (2006)). 
66. Id. at 70–71 (2010). 
9
Hamoud: A Contractual Dilemma: Where Arbitration Agreements and Delegatio
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
614  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
arbitration agreement.67  Consider the significant controlling weight afforded 
delegation provisions from Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may not rule on the threshold 
issue of arbitrability even where the “argument that the arbitration agreement 
applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless.”68  Such a result would 
seem to suggest that courts are essentially powerless in addressing threshold 
issues of arbitrability, potentially risking far from optimal results.  However, 
the U.S. Supreme Court provided critical guidance in New Prime v. Oliveira, 
holding that a court should first determine whether the “contracts of 
employment” exclusion under Section 1 of the FAA applies before ordering 
arbitration.69  Indeed, it is only for a contract falling within the scope of the 
FAA that a court may exercise the severability principle.70  Thus, New Prime 
not only stands for a rejection of an expansive interpretation of the FAA by 
the United States Supreme Court, but also a close reading of the entire statute 
that rejects viewing any one section in isolation.71 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Theroff, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there neither existed 
a valid agreement to compel arbitration, nor assent to the delegation 
provision.72  This Part first examines the principal opinion’s determination of 
the existence of an arbitration agreement as well as the controlling weight of 
the delegation provision.73  Finally, this Part concludes by briefly examining 
the concurring and dissenting opinions. 
 
67. Id. (emphasis added). 
68. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019).  
“When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the 
courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract.” Id. at 528. 
69. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019) (emphasis added).  
“The parties' private agreement may be crystal clear and require arbitration of every 
question under the sun, but that does not necessarily mean the Act authorizes a court 
to stay litigation and send the parties to an arbitral forum.” Id. at 537–38. 
70. Id. at 538. (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 402 (1967)). 
71. See Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court's Landmark Decision in New Prime 
Inc. v. Oliveira: A Panoptic View of America's Civil Justice System and Arbitration, 
68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1059, 1072 (2019). 
72. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 439–40 (Mo. 2020) (en 
banc). 
73. As a majority of the Judges did not agree on a single opinion, the use of the 
term “Principal Opinion” was adopted from the case to refer to that part of the opinion 
that provided the underlying rationale for the disposition of the case as a whole.  
Plurality opinions are synonymous with principal opinions. James A. Bloom, Plurality 
and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States 
v. Winstar Corp, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 n.16 (2008). 
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A.  The Principal Opinion 
The principal opinion, written by Judge Mary R. Russell, affirmed the 
order overruling Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay 
proceedings.74  The Court found no support necessary to reverse the circuit 
court’s order overruling the motion to compel.75  In reviewing the case, the 
court first analyzed whether there actually existed a mutual agreement to 
arbitrate under Section 435.355.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, since this 
was a necessary prerequisite to compelling arbitration.76 
Theroff disputed that she actually “signed” the agreement because she 
did not explicitly authorize Swift to make the operative click.77  Alternatively, 
even if Theroff herself clicked the agreement suggesting her consent, Theroff 
was not placed on adequate notice of the existence of the agreement – Swift 
did not inform Theroff of the agreement and Theroff could not read it because 
of her blindness.78  Defendants, however, argued that not only was Theroff 
aware of the arbitration agreement and had knowledge of its existence, she 
signed it.79 
The court reasoned that Theroff’s assertions that she did not see, read, 
know of, or assent to the arbitration agreement essentially amounted to a 
challenge to the arbitration agreement’s existence.80  Thus, Theroff’s 
argument that assent – or a meeting of the minds – did not occur served as a 
challenge to the existence of the agreement, itself a prerequisite to compelling 
arbitration.81  The court further observed that, by this same reasoning, the 
circuit court impliedly found there was no agreement to compel arbitration by 
overruling the motion to compel.82  Unfortunately, no express findings of fact 
 
74. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439. 
75. Id. (citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en banc)). 
76. Id. at 436. 
77. Id. at 436–37. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 437. 
80. Id. at 438.  The Court made this inference despite Theroff never expressly 
citing Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.355.1 in challenging “the existence of the agreement to 
arbitrate.” Id. 
81. Id. at 438–39; see also Arrowhead Contracting, Inc. v. M.H. Washington, 
LLC, 243 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The existence of a contract 
necessarily implies there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
82. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439.  
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or law were provided by the circuit court’s order.83  Deferring to the trial 
court’s witness credibility assessment, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
order.84 
As a final matter, the court addressed the effectiveness of the delegation 
provision.85  Whether a contract falls within the coverage of the FAA is a 
preliminary inquiry to be applied before applying the FAA’s severability 
principle.86  This inquiry results in a separate challenge to the arbitration 
agreement, or delegation provision, apart from the overall contract.87  The 
court reasoned that because there did not exist an agreement between the 
parties to arbitrate, by extension, there could not exist “clear and unmistakable 
evidence of the existence of assent to a delegation provision.”88  
B.  The Concurrence 
Judge Patricia Breckenridge concurred in the principal opinion.89  The 
concurrence acknowledged that the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,90 quoted in three recent Missouri 
cases,91 “were broad enough to imply that the failure of a party to separately 
challenge a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement required a court to 
sustain a motion to compel arbitration so that formation disputes, including 
challenges to the delegation clause, could be decided by the arbitrator.”92  
 
83. Id.  However, while the lower court did not make specific findings of fact, it 
is worth emphasizing that the plurality nonetheless concluded that the judge must have 
necessarily found an absence of assent. Id. at 441. 
84. Id. at 439 (noting that “[t]he circuit court could have believed Theroff’s 
account that she could not see the screen, was not able to view or read the arbitration 
agreement on her own because she did not have the proper assistive device, or did not 
know the arbitration agreement was included in the onboarding material through 
which Swift verbally guided her … this Court cannot say otherwise.”).  It is worth 
noting that this ruling does not mean the case is over.  The facts of the underlying 
claim still have to be decided and fought over. 
85. Id.  “The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues 
concerning the arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 
68 (2010). 
86. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 
532, 538 (2019)). 
87. Id. (same). 
88. Id. (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the circuit court cannot delegate 
the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends upon an agreement.”). 
89. Id. (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
90. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 68. 
91. See State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017) (en 
banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Mo. 2018) (en 
banc); State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
92. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 441(Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
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However, Rent-A-Center’s holding was recently clarified by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in New Prime.93 
New Prime held that it is a court’s responsibility to determine whether a 
contract lies within Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA before compelling 
arbitration.94  This holding means arbitration should only be ordered by the 
court where there exists a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce.95  The concurrence reasoned that even in the absence of a party’s 
explicit challenge to a delegation provision, the court must still determine 
whether the FAA applies and, consequently, its own authority to send the 
dispute to arbitration.96  The problem with the dissenting opinions’ reasoning, 
as the concurrence sharply notes, “would have the Court put the cart before 
the horse” in first determining the appearance of an arbitration provision 
without first asking whether a contract even exists.97 
C.  Judge Powell’s Dissent 
Judge W. Brent Powell dissented in the principal opinion, arguing that 
the principal opinion represented a departure from previous authority.98  More 
specifically, Powell contended that Theroff, by not explicitly challenging the 
“existence or validity of the delegation provision,” instead only challenged 
the formation of the greater arbitration agreement.99  Because such a formation 
dispute amounted to a “threshold [issue] of arbitrability,” the circuit court 
lacked authority, mandating reversal of the circuit court’s order.100 
D.  Judge Fischer’s Dissent 
Judge Zel M. Fischer also dissented in the principal opinion.101  Like 
Powell’s dissent, Fischer argued that the principal opinion disregarded 
 
93. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537–38 (2019). 
94. Id. at 537. 
95. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 441 (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
96. Id. at 441–42. 
97. Id. at 442. 
98. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).  Powell drew distinctions against three Supreme 
Court of Missouri cases. See State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471 (Mo. 
2019) (en banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111 (Mo. 2018) 
(en banc); State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
99. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 442 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. (quoting Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017) (en 
banc)). 
101. Id. at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
13
Hamoud: A Contractual Dilemma: Where Arbitration Agreements and Delegatio
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
618  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
previous authority.102  Fischer criticized the principal opinion’s reliance on a 
“flawed distinction” between a contract’s “existence” or “conclusion” and its 
“formation.”103  Since the issue at hand was whether the arbitration agreement 
existed, as Theroff argued that she never assented to it, this was equivalent to 
asking whether a contract was actually formed.104  And since the “plain terms” 
of the delegation clause assigned “gateway questions of arbitrability,” 
including questions over a contract’s formation, to an arbitrator, reversal was 
required.105 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part first critiques the principal opinion, concurrence, and two 
dissents in Theroff.   Next, the societal considerations of the decision are laid 
forth.  Finally, this Part concludes by returning to the original contractual 
dilemma presented at the beginning of this Note. 
A.  Theroff Takeaways 
The principal opinion has taken a pragmatic step towards precedent 
regarding the treatment of arbitration and delegation clauses in Theroff.  
Theroff raises legitimate concerns about the grounding of the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s decision when compared to U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri 
precedent, fundamental contract questions, and other practical concerns.  
However, despite these concerns, the principal opinion’s ruling cleanly 
resolves Theroff by minimizing the more drastic impacts that could be realized 
if the approaches called for in both dissents were instead utilized. 
Judge Powell’s dissent raised the concern that Theroff did not 
specifically challenge the arbitration provision, but rather the formation of the 
greater arbitration agreement.106  And since formation disputes were threshold 
issues of arbitrability, Powell argued that the court did not have jurisdiction 
to hear them.107  Similarly, Judge Fischer argued that “gateway questions of 
arbitrability,” including questions over a contract’s formation, must be sent to 
an arbitrator, further rejecting the premise that there existed a difference 
between formation and existence.108 
 
102. Id. at 446–47.  Fischer drew distinctions against two Supreme Court of 
Missouri cases. See generally State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471 (Mo. 
2019) (en banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111 (Mo. 2018) 
(en banc). 
103. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 447. 
105. Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)). 
106. Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 442 (quoting Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017) 
(en banc)). 
108. Id. at 447 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 
561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)).  Indeed, Judge Fischer concurred with Judge Powell, but 
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Both of these arguments are not easily reconciled with New Prime.  New 
Prime held that it is a court’s responsibility to first determine whether a 
contract lies within Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA before compelling 
arbitration.109  In other words, a court must find the existence of a valid 
contract prior to submitting the parties to arbitration.  Further, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri recently unanimously agreed that “[c]ourts should not 
assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] 
and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”110  This would suggest that 
where, as here, there did not exist “clear and unmistakable evidence of the 
existence of assent to a delegation provision,” the dispute clearly cannot be 
sent to arbitration.111 
Judge Breckenridge’s concurrence succinctly grasps the oft-conflicting 
interests at play when a court is to initially consider the applicability of a 
delegation clause.  On the one hand, Rent-A-Center could be interpreted 
broadly such that where a party fails to separately challenge a delegation 
clause in an arbitration agreement, the rule should be formation and delegation 
provision disputes are to be resolved by the arbitrator.112  But it follows from 
New Prime that arbitration should only be ordered by the court where there 
exists a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.113  This 
becomes a simple logical inquiry when stripped down to its core: was an 
arbitration agreement even formed by the parties?  If the answer is no, as here, 
then it plainly follows that the invalid agreement is not covered by the FAA.  
One can follow this one-step inquiry to reach the same result regarding 
treatment of the delegation provision under Judge Breckenridge’s framework.  
B.  Societal Considerations 
There still remain outstanding concerns regarding matters of efficiency, 
justice, and public policy regarding arbitration agreements and delegation 
provisions.  Mutuality of obligation in an arbitration agreement seems to touch 
 
only separately dissented to address the “flawed distinction” between “existence” and 
“formation.” Id. at 446. 
109. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 538 (2019). 
110. State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474–75 (Mo. 2019) (en 
banc), abrogated by Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 432 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). 
111. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the 
circuit court cannot delegate the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends 
upon an agreement.”). 
112. Id. at 441 (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
113. Id. 
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all three concerns.114  Consider the situation where an arbitration agreement 
between an employer and employee explicitly grants in the employer, but not 
the employee, the option to litigate a certain number of issues, rather than 
arbitrate them.115  Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Missouri case of Eat v. 
CMH Homes, Inc. states that a lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement 
does not necessarily result in a nullification of the arbitration agreement; 
rather, it is one factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is 
unconscionable.116  This lack of mutuality suggests that the valid existence of 
a delegation provision could turn on the presence or lack of consideration. 
Theroff serves as a further illustration of the benefits and detriments that 
arbitration agreements present for employers and employees alike.  Dollar 
Tree’s significant bargaining power as a large, commercial party leaves no 
doubt that it is the more sophisticated and knowledgeable drafting party than 
the employees on the other side of the bargaining table.117  What is especially 
concerning is where, as here, this asymmetry in bargaining power correlates 
with an especially disparate impact on disabled employees, like Theroff.  This 
could extend to concerns for non-English speakers, minorities, and people 
with less education or experience with contracts.  Additionally, as a private 
proceeding between parties, an arbitrator’s decision lacks precedential power 
that would be respected by the courts.118  However, arbitration may not best 
serve society in this context, as employment law would be further advanced 
and respected instead by public adjudication.119 
A legitimate efficiency argument also exists in support of arbitration 
agreements.  Arbitration offers a more informed, timely, economical, and 
private resolution of a dispute than if that same dispute was adjudicated in 
court.120  Arbitration is often less costly than litigating, due in part to 
arbitration’s limited allowance for discovery, less formal structure, and highly 
limited scope of judicial review.121  Because of its lower cost structure, some 
employees may have a greater incentive to bring forth a claim in arbitration 
that they otherwise would not have litigated in court.122  Furthermore, 
arbitration benefits the public in that it shifts a pre-defined number of claims 
 
114. See Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(quoting Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (Mo. 1937)) (noting 
that “[m]utuality of contract means that an obligation rests upon each party to do or 
permit to be done something in consideration of the act or promise of the other; that 
is, neither party is bound unless both are bound.”). 
115. See id. at 434. 
116. Id. 
117. See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small 
Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 608 (2009). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 605. 
121. Id. at 606. 
122. Id. at 607. 
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that would have otherwise been brought forward in court to the arbitrator’s 
purview, therefore freeing-up and reallocating the public’s limited resources 
– including courtrooms, judges, and juries – for other claims.123  And if an 
employer is subjected to a lesser amount of litigated claims, a standard 
economic analysis would seemingly posit that consumers would benefit from 
lower prices.124 
The approaches advanced by the principal and concurring opinions in 
Theroff appropriately balance these competing interests, while maintaining a 
fair and predictable outcome for employees and employers alike.  The 
principal opinion found that assent – or a meeting of the minds – did not occur, 
which served as a challenge to the existence of the agreement, itself a 
prerequisite to compelling arbitration.125  The principal opinion further 
concluded that because there was no agreement between the parties to 
arbitrate, there could not be “clear and unmistakable evidence of the existence 
of assent to a delegation provision.”126  Along this same line, the concurrence 
reasoned that even in the absence of a party’s explicit challenge to a delegation 
provision, the court must still determine whether the FAA applies and, 
consequently, its own authority to send the dispute to arbitration.127 
C.  Confronting the Contractual Dilemma 
Now armed with the necessary analytical backing, the original dilemma 
can be confidently approached.  Must assent to the arbitration agreement, and 
thus the delegation provision, exist before the dispute will be sent to 
arbitration, or is the simple appearance of a delegation provision, combined 
with an absence of an explicit challenge to that same provision, per se 
sufficient to send the arbitrability dispute to the arbitrator?  In answering this 
 
123. Id. at 606. 
124. See Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 85 (2017).  However, “[w]hile [the 
assertion that adhesive consumer arbitration agreements result in lower prices for 
consumers, especially in highly competitive industries] is the standard economic 
analysis, the one study attempting to assess it empirically found no statistically 
significant evidence to support it.” Id. at 84.  
125. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 438–39 (Mo. 2020) 
(en banc); see also Arrowhead Contracting, Inc. v. M.H. Washington, LLC, 243 
S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The existence of a contract necessarily implies 
there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
126. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the 
circuit court cannot delegate the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends 
upon an agreement.”). 
127. Id. at 441–42 (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
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question, one cannot help but be reminded that there exists a presumption of 
arbitrability for contracts containing an arbitration clause.128  However, this 
presumption is flipped when considering the validity of a delegation 
provision, or arbitrability about arbitrability.129 
Keeping in mind this “reverse presumption,”130 the result reached in 
Theroff starts to come into focus.  As the concurrence sharply observes, the 
approaches taken by the dissents “would have the Court put the cart before 
the horse” in first determining the appearance of an arbitration provision 
without first asking whether a contract even exists.131  Viewed in this light, 
assent to both the arbitration agreement and delegation provision thus 
becomes a critical threshold inquiry to establishing not only application of the 
FAA, but also the court’s own authority to hear and transfer the dispute to 
arbitration, if necessary.132 
Theroff illustrates a necessary, baseline level of judicial scrutiny to 
delegation provisions and arbitration agreements in a current economic 
environment where many Missouri and American workers face significant 
bargaining challenges.  Notably, while as many as a third of American 
workers were unionized in the mid-1950s, today, approximately just 10.5% of 
Americans belong to a union.133  Indeed, it is perhaps no coincidence that it is 
amongst this backdrop of organized labor’s decline that a new employment 
law scheme has emerged across the country.134  The needle must be carefully 
thread in deciding whether to settle employment disputes by arbitration or 
litigation.  This decision requires not only close scrutiny of the actual 
agreement between the parties, but consideration of the wider factors 
presented above. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Under a backdrop of convincing precedent and extensive interpretations 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal opinion in Theroff declined to find 
the existence of either a valid agreement to compel arbitration or assent to the 
 
128. See AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 
(1986). 
129. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 79 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 
(1995). 
130. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 79 (quoting First Options of Chicago, 
Inc., 514 U.S. at 945 (1995)). 
131. Theroff, 591 S.W.3dat 442 (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
132. Id. at 441–42. 
133. Marick Masters, How organized labor can reverse decades of decline, 
WAYNE ST. U. (Aug. 2, 2019) https://clas.wayne.edu/news/how-organized-labor-can-
reverse-decades-of-decline-36673. 
134. James Ottavio Castagnera & Michael Ostrowski, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Employment Law, 57 AM. JUR. TRIALS 255 (1995). 
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delegation provision.135  Although the court was substantially divided, the 
principal opinion’s findings are not chiefly problematic provided prior 
decisions at odds in this area.  In short, the plurality’s ruling gives Missouri 
courts limited autonomy to make a fact-based inquiry about whether there 
even exists a valid contractual agreement before sending the parties to 
arbitration.  Such a decision could arguably invite more litigation between 
parties that dispute threshold issues of arbitrability, such as here, thus 
effectively nullifying one of the oft-advanced benefits of arbitration, which is 
lower costs.  However, what is sacrificed in terms of cost or efficiency is 
gained when it comes to protecting the concerns raised by parties with weaker 
bargaining power, such as in Theroff.  This problem, it would seem, would be 
a preliminary matter best left for resolution by the courts. 
 
135. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439–40. 
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